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Three Plants, 
Three Futures 
BY LOWELL TURNER 
lo spread teamwork and cooperation, 
managers need to reform themselves—especially 
their attitudes about workers. 
AJJ 
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NEW United Motor Manufactur-ing, Inc. (NUMMI), the General Motors-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, Calif., has shown that U.S. automakers can achieve Jap-anese levels of productivity and quality. As a result, NUMMI'S 
"team concept" has become a model for work re-
organization in the entire industry. General Motors 
is trying to spread elements of the NUMMI model to 
its plants across the country. Chrysler has negotiated 
"modern operating agreements" based on team or-
ganization at several plants. Even Ford, the most 
successful U.S. auto company in recent years, has 
begun to move toward NUMMi-style work systems. 
But while the need to reorganize work has been 
accepted, actually implementing some version of the 
NUMMI model beyond a few demonstration plants 
has proven elusive. Successfully reorganizing work 
requires changing institutions that have shaped the 
auto industry for half a century—in particular, the 
system of labor-management relations established in 
the 1930s and 1940s between the United Auto 
Workers Union (UAW) and the auto companies. 
Traditionally, management in the mass-produc-
tion auto industry has been hierarchical and quite 
often authoritarian. This system is personified by the 
foreman who, functioning as a kind of "drill ser-
geant," enforces shop-floor discipline. Industrial 
unionism was a response to the abuses of that sys-
tem. Union contracts spell out the rights of individ-
ual workers through detailed job definitions. 
Seniority systems ensure that favoritism is not a fac-
tor in assigning jobs. And formal procedures for 
grievance and arbitration offer a mechanism to re-
solve disputes. 
Such provisions have given unions a particular 
kind of power on the shop floor—the ability to reg-
ulate job descriptions and assignments. But in ex-
change, they have ceded to management the right to 
run the business as it sees fit, a principle enshrined 
in the "managerial prerogative" clause of most union 
contracts. 
Recent initiatives to reorganize work challenge 
this labor-management relationship. They weaken 
T Q 
T H E 
9 Os 
traditional mechanisms for union power. Team or-
ganization usually means reducing the number of job 
classifications and allocating labor more flexibly, 
often at the price of weakening seniority protections 
and giving management wider discretion in assigning 
jobs. And fostering cooperation between labor and 
management means minimizing the use of formal 
grievance and arbitration, the traditional vehiclefor 
the expression of union influence. 
Of course, more cooperative forms of work or-
ganization can also lead to new kinds of union in-
fluence—in particular, a voice in decisions about 
how work is organized and how technology is used. 
This possibility has made reorganization attractive 
to some UAW leaders. However, unions have had 
little say in such decisions in the past, and today 
companies tend to reorganize work without much 
reference to union concerns. 
In some cases, firms have tried to create Japanese-
style plants while avoiding unionization altogether. 
Nissan and Honda have done this at their new fa-
cilities in Smyrna, Tenn., and Marysville, Ohio. And 
even at plants where unions have been established 
for years, local managers often attempt to reorganize 
work in a way that diminishes union influence. 
This approach is shortsighted. In the long run, 
cooperation cannot be forced upon unwilling work-
ers. The more managers use reorganization against 
the UAW, the more workers and the union will move 
to obstruct workplace changes such as teamwork. 
For these reasons, the attitudes and actions of local 
management are crucial in determining whether 
work reorganization at a particular plant succeeds. 
Some high-level managers may have gotten this mes-
sage, but they still have to persuade many middle 
managers and foremen who have not. Firms must 
convince not only their unionized workers but also 
LOWELL TURNER, aTformer union representative for the National 
Association of Letter Carriers, is a research associate at the Berkeley 
Roundtable on the International Economy at the University of Cali-
fornia. This year he is a doctoral research fellow of the Social Science 
Research Council and the Max-Planck-Institut in Cologne, West Ger-
many, where he is comparing changes in work organization and indus-
trial relations in the U.S. and German auto and telecommunications 
industries. 
At NUMMI, 
management has provided a system of work and rewards 
that has earned the loyalty of most employees 
and local union leaders. 
their own managerial personnel that reorganization 
is a good idea. 
Such widespread organizational changes will be 
the product of a prolonged trial-and-error process. 
While it is too soon to know the ultimate result, 
three recent cases suggest some likely scenarios: 
• At NUMMI itself, the team approach has been suc-
cessful in part because Toyota managers realized 
how important it was to train their own staff in new 
ways of dealing with the work force. But even 
NUMMI has not developed exactly as managers had 
originally envisioned. In particular, the union plays 
a more independent role than is the case in Japanese 
auto plants. 
• At the General Motors assembly plant in Van 
Nuys, Calif., the organizational innovations that 
have succeeded at NUMMI have so far fallen short— 
because of management's inability or unwillingness 
to reform its own practices. Managerial demands 
have sparked strong opposition among shop-floor 
workers. 
• At GM's Plant # 1 in Lansing, Mich., management 
and the local union have worked together to create 
a "homegrown" version of work reorganization that 
combines innovations like teams with features of 
traditional U.S. labor relations. This hybrid may be 
the most appropriate model for the U.S. auto in-
dustry. 
HE team concept has 
_ made possible large im-
• provements in quality and 
J L . productivity at NUMMI'S 
Fremont, Calif., plant. For many 
workers, it has also enhanced work 
life. Management has provided a 
system of work and rewards that 
has earned the loyalty of a majority 
of the work force and union lead-
ership. 
At NUMMI, job classifications are 
minimized, with production work-
ers in one category and skilled-trade 
workers in two others—compared 
with over a hundred classifications 
in the original GM Fremont plant. 
Workers are divided into teams, 
usually of five, each with a leader 
who is a union member. 
Team leaders are carefully se-
lected and trained by management. 
They check parts and equipment, do 
some repairs, fill in for absent mem-
bers, keep records, and otherwise 
coordinate work. That includes 
leading team meetings, looking for ways to foster 
quality and productivity, and encouraging members 
to provide suggestions for improving production. 
Team members are usually trained to perform all 
the jobs assigned to their unit so they can help out 
as the need arises. They are expected to maintain 
high standards and find ways to make work more 
CASE#1 
NUMMI 
Winning the Loyalty 
of the Work Force 
productive. 
Under the NUMMI team system, 
management has considerable flex-
ibility in assigning jobs. For in-
stance, qualifications count more 
than seniority—although some 
workers complain that manage-
ment decisions about who is most 
qualified are arbitrary. Group lead-
ers, the first line of management, 
oversee several teams. They are 
equivalent to the foremen of a tra-
ditional auto plant, although the 
idea is that they should function as 
problem solvers rather than as drill 
sergeants. While many group lead-
ers seem to understand that new 
role, some do not. For this reason, 
a worker's experience with teams 
can depend in large part on the at-
titudes and behavior of the group 
leader. 
The union has a variety of formal 
and informal mechanisms for ex-
erting its influence at the NUMMI 
plant. In addition to the 15 full-time 
union representatives, there are 67 union coordi-
nators. These full-time workers, who are elected by 
their peers, solve labor-management problems on the 
shop floor, without recourse to the formal grievance 
procedure. When a conflict cannot be resolved in 
this way, it is referred to a full-time union represen-
tative, who decides whether to file a grievance. For-
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mal grievances do occur at NUMMI, 
although far less frequently than at a 
traditional auto plant. 
Union leaders also regularly attend 
management meetings and partici-
pate at various levels of decision 
making. For example, they play a 
central role in hiring new employees. 
Finally, not only does the plant's 
union contract give workers wages 
comparable to those at other UAW-
organized assembly plants, but it in-
cludes special provisions such as a 
promise not to lay off people except 
in the most adverse market circum-
stances. NUMMI made good on this 
promise when sales of the plant's 
Chevy Nova slumped badly last year. 
In interviews with NUMMI workers, including op-
ponents of the current local union leadership, I have 
yet to hear anyone express a preference for the old 
GM system. People like the fact that they are treated 
with some respect, turn out a high-quality product, 
work in a clean and efficient environment, and often 
find their advice and concerns actively solicited. 
Team leaders in particular are grateful to have more 
than just a job, and many thrive on their new lead-
ership responsibilities and the opportunity to come 
up with creative solutions to production problems. 
But this is not to say that NUMMI is a workers' 
Utopia. The People's Caucus, an opposition group 
within the local union, has become a strong and 
visible force in the plant on the strength of its crit-
icisms of the team system's limits. At NUMMI, caucus 
members argue, there is constant pressure to work 
harder and faster, not just smarter. They say that 
the close collaboration between union and manage-
ment makes the two indistinguishable, and that as 
a result the union no longer provides strong repre-
sentation for its members. Caucus members also 
maintain that the informal mechanisms for Union 
involvement make for an undemocratic union, be-
cause they lead to too many closed-door meetings 
and behind-the-scenes deals between union leaders 
and management. 
Whether these charges are true is a subject of lively 
debate within the work force at NUMMI. And yet 
supporters of the People's Caucus are careful to em-
phasize that they are also supporters of NUMMI and 
the team concept. They see themselves as striving to 
make the system better by making it more humane 
'HI 
NUMMI workers 
found jobs and condi-
tions that exceeded 
their expectations of 
life in an auto plant. 
and more democratic. 
When asked to explain workers' 
general support of the team concept, 
GM managers emphasize the "sig-
nificant emotional event": before the 
plant opened as the site of the joint 
venture, it had been closed for two 
years. Workers who had been laid off 
returned to the facility humbled and 
grateful for their new jobs. 
This may have influenced worker 
attitudes, but it's hardly the chief fac-
tor. Other plants have reopened 
without nearly the same kind of or-
ganizational success. Far more im-
portant is what workers face when 
they go back to work. At NUMMI, 
they found jobs and conditions that in many ways 
exceeded their expectations of life in an auto plant. 
Management, from the executives at the top to 
the group leaders on the shop floor, emphasized gar-
nering worker input and gaining consensus. What's 
more, they offered tangible benefits such as employ-
ment security in return for worker and union co-
operation. In this way, they won the commitment of 
workers and union leaders to the new plan. 
Paradoxically, this outcome was not entirely man-
agement's doing. The original intent was to exclude 
the union, hiring a brand new, thoroughly screened, 
and pliable work force—just as Nissan and Honda 
have done at their U.S. facilities. 
But the UAW was entrenched in the former work 
force at the Fremont plant and gained the right to 
represent workers at the new plant as well. The 
union convinced the GM-Toyota joint venture to 
give former Fremont workers preference in hiring. 
It also negotiated full-time union representatives, 
which at first the company opposed, in addition to 
the many shop-floor union coordinators. The union 
presence at NUMMI has contributed to acceptance of 
the team system and, so far, to its success. 
Since the plant opened in 1984, local union pol-
itics have also shown the potential to push the 
NUMMI model in new directions. In June 1988 union 
elections, workers sent a sophisticated message to 
management. By reelecting the union leadership, 
they communicated their overall support for the 
NUMMI system. By giving People's Caucus supporters 
a majority of the union-coordinator slots on the shop 
floor, they underlined their desire for more aggres-
sive protection of union rights within that system. 
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ONE plant where GM man-agement has invested a major effort to adopt the lessons of NUMMI is the 
Van Nuys assembly facility in Los 
Angeles, but no glowing productiv-
ity, quality, or cost improvements 
have yet been advertised. By all ac-
counts, the team system and labor-
management relations at the plant 
face a rocky future. Van Nuys il-
lustrates what happens when man-
agement polarizes workers in its 
push for reorganization and fails to 
adequately screen and retrain its 
own front-line supervisors and mid-
dle managers. 
The Van Nuys facility produces 
about 200,000 Camaros and Pon-
tiac Firebirds each year. Since these 
cars sell for about $20,000 and thus 
occupy a specialty niche, the plant 
would seem to be a good candidate 
for multi-skilled and multi-task 
team organization. In 1986, the new 
manager Ernie Shaefer, previously 
in charge of the innovative Fiero plant in Pontiac, 
Mich., negotiated a labor agreement based on the 
team system with the union's shop bargaining com-
mittee. It included drastic reductions in job classi-
fications and increased managerial flexibility in 
assigning jobs. 
Management and cooperating union leaders pre-
sented the contract to the work force as a way to 
convince GM corporate headquarters that the Van 
Nuys plant, long threatened with shutdown, was 
worth keeping open. The rank and file rejected the 
agreement, but then the plant-closing threat was re-
vived. Workers were inclined to take it seriously, 
since the second shift had already been laid off, and 
when they voted again, they passed the agreement 
by a small margin. 
With the help of $20 million from California's 
Employment Training Panel, 125 workers were 
taught to be instructors. Then 1,100 team leaders 
were selected and trained for 10 weeks in the team 
concept. Finally, in May 1987, the entire remaining 
work force on both shifts received seven days of 
training, and the new system went into effect. 
However, support for the agreement wasi-never 
widespread, either in the work force—as the close 
CASE #2 
VAN NUYS 
Managers Force 
Participation 
margins of the two votes suggest— 
or among the'local union leader-
ship. And one month after the in-
troduction of the system, a hotly 
contested local union election 
ousted the pro-team shop chairman 
(the highest UAW official in the 
plant). He was replaced by the pre-
vious local president, an opponent 
of the new agreement, who pro-
ceeded to pull the union out of all 
the joint labor-management com-
mittees that had been set up to ad-
minister and facilitate the team 
system. 
M a n a g e m e n t r e sponded by 
trying to move around the new shop 
chairman and his allies, with some 
success. Managers drew into the 
team process whoever was willing 
to participate, including other mem-
bers of the union bargaining com-
mittee and team leaders. The new 
local union president led the union 
efforts to make the team system 
work. 
Tension reached a high point in the spring of 1988 
in a rapid series of events: First, Van Nuys manage-
ment fired the anti-team shop chairman, allegedly 
for lying about past absences. Then, the company 
unilaterally announced that the plant's seat-cushion 
operation would be farmed out to a subcontractor— 
at a cost of 130 union jobs—hardly an action de-
signed to win labor's trust. Finally, Ernie Shaefer 
was transferred to a new assignment, raising doubts 
among both managers and workers about GM's 
commitment to the plant and the reorganization pro-
cess. The new plant manager claims he fully supports 
the work-reform efforts, but tensions remain high. 
Managers tend to explain away the problems at 
Van Nuys by saying that because the plant has never 
been closed, the work force hasn't suffered enough 
to be willing to embrace the new system. But workers 
at Van Nuys have in fact suffered through consid-
erable uncertainty and dislocation. The entire second 
shift, half the work force, has been on long-term 
layoff. Moreover, some of the workers are recent 
transfers from other plants that have closed, and for 
years GM has threatened to close the Van Nuys 
facility as well. 
Another common managerial explanation for the 
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I\t Lansing, labor-management 
cooperation has improved productivity and the 
quality of work life without assaulting 
traditional union protections. 
Van Nuys failure is that the strong organized pres-
ence of union militants at the plant has made the 
plan unworkable. Even before the introduction of 
the team concept, union representatives and workers 
from Van Nuys had organized an active "labor-com-
munity coalition" to keep the plant open in the face 
of GM's threats to close. 
However, this argument assumes that union ac-
tivists will necessarily oppose labor-management co-
operation. In fact, a number of coalition supporters 
have become team leaders and advocates of the new 
system. And at NUMMI, former militants from the 
old GM plant head the cooperation-oriented local 
union leadership. 
The main difficulty at Van Nuys is not worker 
resistance but management's failure to reorganize 
itself for the tasks at hand. By contrast, management 
at NUMMI has taken a genuinely new approach, char-
acterized in part by comprehensive attention to hu-
man relations. Both Van Nuys workers and NUMMI 
visitors to the plant—sent down by GM and the 
UAW to assist reform initiatives—say that manage-
ment has asked for a major transformation of 
worker attitudes and job descriptions while on the 
shop floor its own personnel often cling to the same 
old authoritarian styles. 
GENERAL MOTORS' Plant #1 in Lansing, Mich., where the Pontiac Grand Am is made, has not re-
ceived the publicity that NUMMI and 
Van Nuys have. Nonetheless, it is 
just as much an experiment in work 
reorganization. In this case, the new 
system is a result of an evolving co-
operative relationship between the 
local management and local union. 
The reforms enhance the quality of 
work life and improve productivity 
without assaulting traditional 
union protections. Workers and 
union representatives have re-
sponded with widespread support. 
At Lansing, the team system 
looks rather different than at 
NUMMI or Van Nuys. Teams are 
larger, consisting of 10 to 25 mem-
bers, and the full-time team coor-
dinators are selected by seniority. 
What's more, participation in 
weekly team meetings is voluntary 
but popular, with interest high in 
the discussions of production, qual-
ity, labor-management relations, 
and general business developments. There are also 
more job classifications at Lansing than at NUMMI, 
although far fewer than at traditional auto plants. 
Several people at the plant have emphasized to me 
that the number of classifications is less important 
than getting people to work together as a team. 
CASE #3 
LANSING 
"Homegrown' 
Cooperation 
All the changes at Lansing have 
been carried out without a number 
of the conditions usually considered 
necessary for the success of team 
systems: job rotation, promises of 
employment security, weakened 
seniority rights in job allocation, or 
the "significant emotional event" of 
a plant closing. 
A key factor has been the inno-
vative approach of plant manage-
ment, led since 1985 by Frank 
Shotters, a self-proclaimed "parti-
cipatory manager." To enhance di-
rect communication and clear 
responsibility, managerial levels 
have been cut from seven to four. 
All management staff meetings are 
open to the union. And managers 
at all levels have gone through a re-
training program to replace author-
itarian attitudes with a more 
participatory approach. Coopera-
tion does seem to be increasing 
throughout the plant. Union rep-
resentatives are regularly drawn 
into discussions and decision mak-
ing right up to the level of the plant 
manager. 
Both management and union have also chosen to 
persuade the workers that a team approach is worth-
while instead of simply imposing it on them. For 
example, in 1986, soon after teams were introduced, 
workers voted to make participation in them vol-
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untary. As a result, partici-
pation dropped to a meager 
30 percent. But neither 
union leadership nor man-
agement responded with 
stepped-up pressure and a 
second vote as is common in 
other GM plants. Rather, 
both set out to convince 
Plant #1 employees that the 
team structure could give 
the work force a new way 
to express its views. As a re-
sult, the voluntary partici-
pation rate is now in the 
range of 80 to 90 percent. 
Managers and union rep-
resentatives are quite con-
scious of Lansing as an 
alternative to NUMMI. At other team-oriented plants, 
they say, top management makes a decision and then 
groups of lower managers and workers discuss it 
until they all agree. At their plant, by contrast, work-
ers, lower-level managers, and union representatives 
are consulted before decisions are made. And all 
groups are encouraged to participate in the decision-
making process itself—from minor shop-floor deci-
sions to strategic planning that affects the entire 
plant. 
Given the established features of industrial rela-
tions in the U.S. auto industry, Lansing may repre-
sent a more suitable model for work reorganization 
than NUMMI'S Fremont, Calif., plant. And the com-
parison between Lansing and Van Nuys is especially 
instructive. At Van Nuys, management's heavy-
handed intervention in union politics may have in-
duced slightly more than half the work force to ac-
cept a NUMMi-type system, but the price has been 
backlash and resistance on the shop floor. At Lan-
sing, on the other hand, extensive labor-management 
cooperation has created a broad consensus in favor 
of work reorganization. 
The difference between Lansing and Van Nuys can 
be seen in the response to last year's poor sales. At 
Van Nuys, management proposed an innovative lay-
off agreement. Instead of laying off workers strictly 
according to seniority as mandated by the union 
contract, the plan called for sharing the burdens and 
benefits of the layoff among the entire work force. 
Doing so would allow the plant to alternate shifts 
on layoff and keep its teams together. Workers re-
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Facing pressure from 
corporate headquarters 
to farm out the produc-
tion of seat cushions, 
employees at GM's Plant 
#1 in Lansing devised a 
plan to organize work 
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more efficiently. Local 
management accepted 
their proposals and 
found new assignments 
for the few people dis-
placed. 
sponded with distrust, 
seeing the proposal as yet 
another attack on seniority 
rights. It took a bitter polit-
ical debate and, once again, 
two votes before Van Nuys 
workers narrowly accepted 
the package. 
At Lansing, the principle 
of seniority rights is not sub-
ject to debate, and a nearly 
identical plan was perceived 
for what it was—a relatively 
fair way to spread the costs 
of the layoff while keeping 
the plant as productive as 
possible. The proposal 
passed by 90 percent. 
Management at the Lan-
sing plant also faced pressure from GM corporate 
headquarters to cut costs by assigning the production 
of seat cushions to subcontractors, as happened at 
Van Nuys. But plant managers took the problem 
directly to the union and the workers in the cushion 
room. After months of joint discussions and brain-
storming, the workers came up with a plan to or-
ganize work in the cushion room more efficiently, 
cutting a few jobs to save the rest. Management 
'accepted the proposals, found new assignments for 
the few people displaced, and now says it will resist 
corporate pressure to farm out seat-cushion work. 
A New Quid Pro Quo 
Lansing is not an isolated case. GM facilities such 
as the Lordstown, Ohio, assembly plant are devel-
oping similar homegrown versions of work reorgan-
ization. However, for every Lansing or NUMMI 
shooting out of the starting blocks, several more 
plants stumble along face to the ground. At some, 
management has hesitated to initiate major reorgan-
ization efforts for fear of causing new conflicts and 
disrupting production. And at others like Van Nuys, 
management has used high-pressure tactics to im-
pose the team concept—hardly an approach that fos-
ters the trust necessary for encouraging workers to 
become involved in problem solving and decision 
making. 
Probably the greatest barrier to effective work re-
organization in the auto industry is management's 
failure to adequately reform its own practices. To 
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make teams work, managers have 
to see reorganization efforts as an 
opportunity to involve the union, 
not defeat it, and to move deci-
sively away from the authoritarian 
tradition of the past. A crucial first 
step would be to retrain current 
managerial personnel, screen new 
candidates for supervisory posi-
tions more carefully, and weed out 
uncooperative managers. 
Whatever management's strat-
egy, work reorganization will still 
pose serious challenges to U.S. 
unions. The UAW's national lead-
ership has supported the move 
toward new working arrange-
ments and generally assisted local 
unions that have negotiated ex-
perimental labor agreements with 
management. But it remains un-
clear whether the union can deliver 
on the promise to improve quality 
of work life throughout the entire 
industry. Indeed, as the various 
models of work reorganization 
multiply and locals devise different 
agreements at different plants, 
there is danger that the UAW will 
become more fragmented, thus di-
minishing its national power. 
The most important task for the 
union is to develop its own vision 
of work reorganization—one that 
speaks to workers' aspirations for 
improved working conditions and 
more challenging jobs, as well as 
to management's imperative to 
create efficient work systems. In-
sisting on substantial participation 
in reorganization efforts before re-
negotiating local labor contracts 
would lay the foundation for a na-
tional union strategy equal to the 
competitive challenges of the auto 
industry in the 1990s and be-
yond. • 
